Nigel Farage has faced widespread criticism for his assertion that, while Vladimir Putin bears primary responsibility for the war in Ukraine, the West's decision to expand NATO contributed to Russia's readiness for confrontation. However, these criticisms are often knee-jerk reactions rather than serious examinations of the evidence.
Farage is undoubtedly correct that Putin is responsible for the unjustified invasion of Ukraine. But his more controversial point about NATO expansion is supported by historical evidence, much of which has been recently researched.
When NATO enlargement first loomed, respected figures like George Kennan and Henry Kissinger warned of the likely damaging effects on Russia-West relations. US Secretary of State James Baker's famous 1990 promise that enlargement would not go "one inch" beyond East Germany was an acknowledgment of the probable Russian backlash, and his subsequent retraction fueled an enduring Russian belief in Western duplicity.
Bill Clinton's 1993 "Partnership for Peace" proposal was specifically designed to postpone the issue and was enthusiastically welcomed by Boris Yeltsin, who was left sad and angry when Clinton abandoned it. The Western argument that NATO is a defensive alliance, and therefore no threat to Russia, carried little weight with Russians who had seen the supposedly defensive Warsaw Pact dismissed similarly.
Ultimately, while Putin's actions in Ukraine are indefensible, Farage's more nuanced perspective on the role of NATO expansion in contributing to the current crisis deserves serious consideration, rather than reflexive dismissal.
In the eyes of Russia, NATO's expansion was problematic, but the potential inclusion of Ukraine (a nation they viewed as closest to them) made it immeasurably worse. The US embassy in Moscow reported that Russians saw this as crossing a "Brightest of Red Lines". As the British ambassador at the time, I was informed by a well-placed contact that it would "destroy the trust of the entire Russian security sector". The demand that Ukraine should not join NATO has since been a central focus in all of Russia's interactions with the West.
Therefore, the Western belief that NATO enlargement was irrelevant is incorrect. It's possible we could be mistaken about other aspects as well. The war is currently at a stalemate, with the frontline barely moving for 18 months. The public war aims of both sides effectively require the total defeat of the other.
Ukraine is pinning its hopes on more weapons from the West, while Russia is relying on its increasingly mobilized and much larger population and economy. The situation appears to be moving, albeit slowly and uncertainly, in Russia's direction. Meanwhile, the carnage, killing, and threat of potentially devastating escalation remain horrifyingly real. The time has come for the West to overcome its much-advertised repugnance and engage in negotiations.
The Russians have been signaling their readiness to engage in talks for some time. While the Americans deny this, in my experience, that type of denial often indicates that they are not yet ready to participate. The Russians have suggested that they would be willing to settle for a ceasefire along the existing battle lines.
Insights from the history of previous peace talks offer clues as to what they may ultimately agree to: Ukraine remaining outside of NATO but with credible security guarantees for both the Ukrainians and Russia; the return of most occupied Ukrainian territory (excluding Crimea); guarantees of cultural and linguistic rights for the populations concerned; and an end to Western sanctions.
Understandably, Ukraine as the victim remains firmly committed to its demands for full territorial restoration, reparations, and war crimes trials - essentially, Russia's complete surrender. This outcome is not likely to occur anytime soon.
Barring a major Russian breakthrough on the battlefield, Ukraine has already won its primary war objective: its survival as a democratic, Western-leaning state, and likely future membership in the EU (which the Russians do not seem to be opposing as strongly as Ukraine's NATO membership).
So Ukraine and its Western backers effectively face a choice: either accept a territorial settlement (with the most difficult aspect being an agreement on Crimea) or continue a prolonged and unpredictable war. Currently, the momentum appears to be with Russia, and we have witnessed a gradual but inexorable drift toward confrontation between Russia and NATO, with all the dreadful escalatory consequences that could entail. The time to talk may have arrived.
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